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THE OBERLIN FUGITIVE SLAVE RESCUE:  
ONE SMALL VICTORY FOR THE HIGHER LAW  
Steven Lubet1 
 
In the late 1850s, the small village of Oberlin, Ohio, was a magnet for fugitive slaves.  The 
eponymous college, founded in 1833, had welcomed African-American students since its 
second year of operation, and it boasted numerous prominent free blacks among its students 
and graduates.  Frederick Douglass sent his daughter Rosetta to Oberlin, and Margru Kinson—
one of the slaves freed by the United States Supreme Court in the Amistad case—also attended 
Oberlin before she returned to Africa as a teacher.  By 1858, Oberlin was surely the most 
racially integrated community in the United States, with white and black citizens living, 
studying, and working side by side.  It was therefore only natural that fugitive slaves were also 
drawn to Oberlin, in the hope that they could blend into the well-established free black 
population.  In fact, Oberliners themselves bragged that their town was “one of the most 
notorious refuges of fugitive slaves in the North.” 
 Needless to say, Oberlin was also a magnet for Kentucky slavehunters, who ranged 
across Ohio in search of runaways.  Perhaps some of the slavehunters were honorable, seeking 
only actual fugitives, but many of them were unscrupulous and quite willing to capture any 
vulnerable black person who could be dragged to Kentucky for a reward.  The slavecatchers 
were aided in their dismal business by the infamous Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which 
empowered them to make arrests on the basis of nothing more than a slavemaster’s “power of 
attorney” and an ex parte document from a southern court.  Sometimes greater formalities 
were observed—perhaps including the issuance of a warrant and a subsequent hearing before 
a federal commissioner—but even then the alleged fugitive was prohibited from testifying and 
was allowed no appeal.  Perhaps most offensively, fugitive slave commissioners were paid a fee 
of $10 for every “certificate of removal” granted to a slavehunter, but only $5 if an alleged 
runaway was released.  Along with many other northerners, the citizens of Oberlin despised the 
Fugitive Slave Act and vowed to resist it at every opportunity.  Just as most slavehunters did not 
care whether their quarry were slaves or free, neither did most Oberliners—they were 
determined to rescue any black person who fell into the slavecatchers’ clutches. 
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 It was therefore hardly surprising when, in the early spring of 1856, a black stranger 
named John Price showed up in Oberlin.  Nearly starving and wearing ragged clothes, and 
speaking with an unmistakable Kentucky accent, there was little question that Price was a 
fugitive.  But the people of Oberlin did not care.  Price was entered on the town records as a 
“poor stranger,” and granted a stipend of $1.25 per week until he could find work.  The 
payment to Price was authorized by the village clerk, John Mercer Langston, a free black man, 
born in Virginia, and the son of a white plantation owner.  A graduate of Oberlin College, 
Langston was one of the first black lawyers in Ohio, and one of the first black public officials 
anywhere in the United States.  Charles Langston, John Mercer’s older brother who was also an 
Oberlin graduate, would soon play the central role in the last great fugitive slave trial before the 
Civil War. 
 John Price lived quietly in Oberlin for the next two years, working as a farm laborer and 
only intermittently relying on public support.  Despite his efforts at anonymity, Price was one 
day recognized by a slavehunter named Anderson Jennings.  Well, perhaps he was recognized.  
Jennings had actually come to Oberlin is search of a slave named Henry, whom he failed to find.  
Rather than return to Kentucky empty-handed, Jennings searched through Oberlin for other 
probable runaways, and eventually settled upon John Price as the likely “property” of his 
neighbor, John Bacon, of Mason County, Kentucky.  Jennings wrote to Bacon, informing him 
that he had “discovered a nigger near Oberlin answering to the description of his runaway, 
John,” and requesting formal authorization to capture Price. 
 Bacon did not hesitate.  He went immediately to the Mason County Circuit Court, where 
a deputy clerk drew up a power of attorney authorizing Jennings “to capture and return the 
negro John, now at large in the State of Ohio.”  The deputy was apparently new on the job, and 
he made some errors on the document that no doubt seemed trivial at the time, although they 
would assume great importance in the trial that followed.  Bacon then entrusted the power of 
attorney to another part-time slavehunter named Richard Mitchell, with instructions to deliver 
it to Jennings in Ohio.  Bacon gave Mitchell money for expenses, and promised him a $500 
reward for the delivery of his human property. 
 Mitchell arrived in Oberlin on Wednesday, September 8, 1858, and met Jennings at a 
hotel owned by Chauncy Wack, one of the few pro-slavery Democrats in town.  Wack, in turn, 
introduced the slavehunters to a deputy federal marshal named Anson Dayton, who was well 
known as an enthusiastic ally of slavehunters.  Dayton cautioned the two Kentuckians that it 
would be difficult to capture a slave in Oberlin, and recommended that they first obtain a 
federal warrant—even though it was not strictly necessary under the Fugitive Slave Act—as 
additional proof that they were acting legally.  Dayton also advised them to maintain secrecy by 
obtaining the warrant from the federal court for the Southern District of Ohio, located in 




Columbus, rather than from the Northern District in nearby Cleveland.   The slavehunters took 
Dayton’s advice and proceeded immediately to Columbus where they had no difficulty 
obtaining a federal warrant, even though it was arguable that Oberlin lay beyond the court’s 
jurisdiction.  That too would become an issue at trial, but for the time being it surely appeared 
that Jennings and Mitchell were well equipped with legal authority for their work.  They 
realized, however, that they might also need more muscle if they were to spirit a slave out of 
Oberlin, so they enlisted two local law officers, Jacob Lowe and Samuel Davis, to assist them in 
their work. 
 The small posse arrived back in Oberlin on September 11, with only one step remaining 
in their plan.  They needed some way to lure John Price out of town, so that he could be 
captured without risk of interference from abolitionist Oberliners.  Once again Chauncy Wack 
provided the necessary information.  He referred the slavehunters to a local farmer named 
Lewis Boynton whose twelve year old son—named Shakespeare—turned out to be willing and 
available to act as a decoy in exchange for a $10 payoff. 
 On the morning of Monday, September 13, young Shakespeare drove his father’s wagon 
to the home of John Price, and invited the black man to join him for a ride in the country.  “The 
fresh air must feel good for you,” the boy said, promising to the unsuspecting John that he 
would “bring you back again.”  John had no reason to mistrust a child, so he climbed into the 
buggy without realizing that he was heading into an ambush.   
 They had only driven about a mile out of town when they were met by a buggy carrying 
Mitchell, Lowe, and Davis (Jennings had remained behind to avert suspicion).  The three 
slavecatchers quickly overpowered John, forcing him at gunpoint from the farm wagon into 
their own buggy.  Satisfied with their work, and with the frightened John Price wedged between 
them, the slavehunters headed away from Oberlin and toward Wellington, ten miles distant, 
which was the nearest town with a railroad station.  They planned to meet Jennings in 
Wellington, and from there to proceed by train to Columbus and ultimately to Kentucky. 
 Fortunately for John, his plight had not gone unobserved.  Another buggy happened to 
be passing in the opposite direction, and its occupants heard John cry out for help.  The driver 
of the second buggy was a young man named Ansel Lyman—an Oberlin student and staunch 
abolitionist who had once served with John Brown’s Free-State militia in Kansas.  Realizing that 
he was outnumbered, Lyman took no immediate action, but he sped his buggy into town where 
he raised the alarm that a black man had been kidnapped on the road to Wellington. 
 As word of the kidnapping spread, a crowd of outraged Oberliners gathered in the town 
square.  At least a hundred of them—both white and black—soon started off on the ten-mile 
trip to Wellington, traveling on horseback, in wagons, and on foot.   




Some of the rescuers were armed, including forty-one-year-old Charles Langston who 
carried a loaded pistol in his waistband.  Charles was twelve years older than his more famous 
younger brother, and both (along with another brother named Gideon) were the sons of 
Virginia plantation owner Ralph Quarles, who was a veteran of the Revolutionary War.  Quarles 
had fallen in love with a slave named Lucy Jane Langston, with whom he had three children.   
Unlike most sexual encounters between masters and slaves—which amounted to nothing more 
than rape—the relationship between Ralph and Lucy was close and devoted, eventually 
becoming a marriage in all but name.  Quarles emancipated Lucy and her children, and he made 
certain that his sons were well educated.  Realizing that mulattos had no future in Virginia, 
Ralph arranged for his children to be raised in Ohio, and he provided for their financial security 
in his will.  Charles Langston had grown up with the firm understanding that he was the equal of 
any white man, and he had become one of the leading militant abolitionists in Ohio.  He no 
doubt carried his pistol for self-defense, as his life had been threatened in the past. 
Charles Langston was later called the leader of the Oberlin rescuers, but that was not 
accurate because the mob itself was leaderless.   The crowd of students, teachers, ministers, 
and townsfolk rushed headlong toward Wellington without coordination and without pausing 
to create any sort of organization. 
In the meantime, Lowe, Mitchell, and Davis arrived in Wellington with their captive in 
the early afternoon.  Quite unaware that they were being pursued, the slavecatchers 
rendezvoused with Anderson Jennings at Wadsworth’s Hotel, where they planned to enjoy a 
leisurely lunch before catching the 5:00 pm train for Columbus.   
The slavecatchers’ meal was interrupted, however, when scores of angry Oberliners 
began to arrive in the village square, where they were joined by as many as a hundred more 
Wellingtonians (who had first been drawn to town by a fire earlier that morning).  Soon the 
crowd realized that the slavehunters and their prisoner were sitting in Wadsworth’s dining 
room, forcing the Kentuckians to retreat to an attic room where they could bar the door.  Oliver 
Wadsworth, the innkeeper, was sympathetic to slavery and he ordered his employees to guard 
every entrance to the building. 
For a while there was a standoff.  The slavehunters could not reach the railroad station, 
but the rescuers—for the time being—were reluctant to storm the hotel by force.  At one point 
Jennings decided that he might be able to calm the threatening mob by appealing to the law.  
He stepped onto a balcony and loudly declared that “this boy is mine by the laws of Kentucky 
and the United States [and] the boy is willing to go to Kentucky.”  That only made things worse, 
as somebody shouted back “There are no slaves in Ohio,” while others demanded that John 
himself be brought onto the balcony. 




Surprisingly, Jennings complied, ducking back into the hotel and returning to the 
balcony with John and the other three slavehunters.  Visibly frightened, John was prodded by 
his captors to tell the crowd that he “supposed” he would have to return to Kentucky because 
Jennings “had got the papers for him.”  The obvious intimidation of the poor slave only made 
the crowd angrier, and people began shouting for John to jump to freedom.  Then Oberliner 
John Copeland—a free black man who would later join John Brown at Harper’s Ferry—began 
waving a pistol in Jennings’s direction.  The mere site of an armed black man panicked the 
Kentuckian, who then dragged Price back into the hotel. 
As the slavehunters kept a wary eye on the crowd, one of them recognized Charles 
Langston.  Deputy Jacob Lowe had known Langston in Columbus—where the latter had worked 
as a schoolteacher and journalist—and considered him “a reasonable man.”  Lowe sent word 
for Langston to join the slavecatchers in the attic, in a last ditch attempt to bring things to a 
peaceful conclusion.  To his great misfortune, Langston accepted the offer and agreed to enter 
negotiations on behalf of the Oberliners. 
The discussion went on for about thirty minutes, but it produced no meaningful results.  
Langston insisted that the slavecatchers simply release their prisoner, pointing out that the 
crowd was “bent upon a rescue at all hazards.”  Lowe responded with a counter-offer, 
suggesting that a committee of Oberliners could escort the posse to Columbus, in order to 
ensure that John would have a fair hearing before a fugitive slave commissioner.  In support of 
his position, Lowe showed the warrant and power of attorney to Langston.  Although the 
validity of the papers would later be disputed, Langston acknowledged that the documents 
appeared to be in order, and he agreed to present Lowe’s proposal to the crowd.  Langston did 
not think that the compromise had any chance of success, as neither he nor any of his Oberlin 
friends placed any confidence in the decisions of a fugitive slave commissioner.  The crowd 
would almost certainly reject the plan outright, he explained to Lowe, saying either “We will 
have him anyhow,” or “They will have him anyhow.”  The disputed pronoun—we or they—
would take on much significance when Langston was later prosecuted for violating the Fugitive 
Slave Act. 
Langston was right, of course, that nobody in the crowd was interested in cooperating 
with slavecatchers, nor was there a leader who could have accepted a compromise even if he 
had wanted to.  Not long after Langston emerged from the hotel, two separate groups of 
Oberliners stormed the building through the front and back doors.  The two groups of 
rescuers—with African-Americans in the forefront—raced up the hotel staircases while pushing 
Wadsworth’s employees out of their way.  Reaching the attic, they called on Jennings and Lowe 
to release their prisoner, but the slavehunters refused.   




After only a few minutes hesitation, the abolitionists burst through the door and 
knocked several of the slavehunters to the ground.  Although some of the rescuers were armed, 
not a shot was fired.  Instead, they lifted John Price onto their shoulders and carried him 
downstairs and into the public square.  Cheering in victory, the rescuers hurriedly threw Price 
into the back of a waiting wagon—driven by an Oberlin bookseller named Simeon Bushnell.  In 
little more than an hour, Price was back in Oberlin.  The freed slave was hidden for a few days 
in the home of a senior professor, and then he was taken surreptitiously to Canada.  Nothing 
more was ever heard from John Price, but John Mercer Langston later expressed confidence 
that “John Price [now] reposes under his own vine and fig tree with no one to molest him or 
make him afraid.” 
Oberlin celebrated the rescue with a bonfire and rally in the town square, while 
abolitionists across the country also rejoiced that at least one black man had been saved from 
bondage.  In official quarters, however, the response was far less favorable.  President James 
Buchanan had been elected in 1856 on a pro-southern platform that promised faithful 
compliance with the Fugitive Slave Act.  Neither Buchanan nor his attorney general, fellow 
Pennsylvanian Jeremiah Black, could tolerate the Oberliners’ blatant disregard for southern 
rights.  They briefly considered bringing treason charges against the rescuers—which would 
have carried the death penalty—but more moderate counsel prevailed and they settled for the 
indictment of 37 rescuers for violating the Fugitive Slave Act.  The defendants included Charles 
Langston and eleven other black men, as well as three leaders of the Oberlin community who 
had not even gone to Wellington.   
From the nature of the indictment, it was obvious that the purpose of the prosecution 
was not merely to punish the actual rescuers, but also to suppress the growing abolitionist 
movement in northern Ohio.  Presiding over the grand jury, Judge Hiram Willson had scoffed at 
the abolitionist concept of “higher law,” as he noted that the Constitution protected all forms 
of property—including slaves—whether they were found “north or south of the Ohio River.” 
 The trials began in Cleveland on March 8, 1859.  The prosecutors, led by United States 
Attorney George Belden, elected to try the defendants one by one, leading off with Simeon 
Bushnell, the unassuming Oberlin bookstore clerk who had been seen driving the getaway 
wagon.  The evidence against Bushnell was overwhelming, as many witnesses had seen him 
speeding away from Wellington with John Price in the back of his wagon.  Bushnell’s lawyers 
attempted to raise various technicalities, including defects in Jennings’s papers, but to little 
effect.   
At the close of the case, the prosecutor hardly bothered to mention Bushnell, focusing 
instead on the entire town of Oberlin.  He assailed “the saints of Oberlin,” while ridiculing “sub-
saint Bushnell.”  He argued that “slaves were not fit for freedom,” and defended the necessity 




of the Fugitive Slave Act. “When the Oberlin men went down to Wellington,” he said, “they 
proclaimed that they did so under the Higher Law, for they knew they were outraging the law 
of the land.” 
 Stunningly, defense attorney Albert Riddle took up the challenge.  He virtually admitted 
that his client had participated in the rescue, boldly adding 
And now, as to the matter referred to, the so-called dogma of the Higher Law . . . I am 
perfectly frank to declare, that I am a votary of that Higher Law. 
Riddle’s announcement had its intended effect.  The courtroom fell silent, as spectators and 
participants realized the impact of what they had just heard.  The ideal of higher law had been 
preached from pulpits and repeated in the streets for almost a decade—ever since Senator 
William Seward had opposed the Fugitive Slave Act by appealing to a “higher law than the 
Constitution”—but it had not been raised as a legal defense in court.  But now attorney Riddle 
had crossed the final barrier, calling the federal Fugitive Slave Act the “sum of all villainies,” and 
urging the jurors to congratulate Bushnell, rather than convict him, for his open disregard for 
the law. 
 The defense team had entered uncharted territory with a bold and unprecedented 
tactic, but it did not impress the court.  Judge Willson told the jury that higher law had no 
bearing outside of an “ecclesiastical tribunal.”  At least some of the jurors, however, appeared 
to have doubts.  They deliberated for over three hours—an unusually long time in that era—
before returning a verdict of guilty. 
 The Bushnell case, however, had only been a warm-up.  The real test of the higher law 
would come in the trial of Charles Langston, which was set to begin the following day. 
 The prosecution of Charles Langston was legally weak but politically important.  
Langston was a statewide leader of the black abolitionist movement, better known at the time 
even than his more professionally accomplished younger brother.  Yet Langston’s involvement 
in the rescue had been largely as a peacemaker.  He played no part in overpowering the 
slavecatchers, but had attempted only to negotiate the voluntary release of their captive.  The 
conviction of Langston would thus serve both as a blow to Ohio’s free black population, and as 
a warning that even nonviolent resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act would be harshly punished. 
 The case against Langston hinged on his alleged threat to Lowe and Jennings that “we 
will have him anyhow.”  On the basis of that single first-person pronoun—as distinct from “they 
will have him”—the prosecutors claimed that Langston was the leader of a conspiratorial mob, 
and therefore responsible for all of the events that followed.  Lowe himself testified to the 
threatening conversation, and he was corroborated by numerous other witnesses—including 




most of the principals; Jennings, Lowe, Mitchell, and even the oleaginous innkeeper Chauncy 
Wack—who claimed to have heard nearly identical statements at various other times and at 
several other locations.  The testimony against Langston was clearly practiced and coordinated. 
It was as though he had spent an entire afternoon proclaiming “we will have him anyhow” to 
just about anybody willing to listen.  One might have thought that an Oberlin graduate would 
have varied his verb choice now and then—perhaps claiming that the crowd would release, 
free, liberate, or even unshackle the prisoner.  But no.  The prosecution witnesses all claimed 
that Langston had used the oddly passive “we will have him” on every occasion. 
 In a modern trial, the defendant could take the stand to deny such an obviously well 
orchestrated accusation, but that was not possible in 1859.  Ohio adhered at the time, as did 
every United States jurisdiction, to the so-called “interested party rule,” which prohibited a 
criminal defendant (whether white or black) from testifying on his own behalf.  The defense 
could point out the defects in Jennings’s Kentucky papers and the jurisdictional flaw in his Ohio 
warrant, but the central charge against Langston could not be refuted or explained by the 
defendant himself.  Although several witnesses testified that they had never themselves heard 
Langston utter the fateful words, it was ultimately impossible to prove the negative—that the 
defendant had never made any incriminating statements to anybody.   
 The prosecution closing argument predictably focused on the “agency Langston had in 
the rescue,” describing him as “very cunning and very hypocritical, very shrewd, but very 
deceiving.”  It was obviously the prosecutor’s intention to criminalize even peaceful resistance 
to the Fugitive Slave Act, especially by black men, and he underscored his point by calling 
Oberlin “a buzzard’s nest [where] negroes who arrive over the underground railroad are 
regarded as dear children.”  “The students who attend that Oberlin College,” he said, “are 
taught sedition and treason.” 
Defense counsel met the charge head on, directly confronting the issue of race.  
Referring to the holding of the infamous Dred Scott decision—that even free black men could 
not be citizens of the United States, and had “no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect”—the defense attorney explained that Langston could never have “a jury of those who 
are his peers.”  “Not only is he an alien,” the lawyer continued, “but in the view of the law 
which governs this Court, he is an outcast.  He has no equality, no rights, except in being 
amenable to the penal statutes.”  Rather than convict Langston, counsel argued, the jury should 
rejoice “over the escape of a brother man from bondage.”  In other words, the defense 
defiantly called upon the jury to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act for the sake of a black man who 
was “inspired by the noblest of motives.” 
 True to form, Judge Willson did his best to undermine the defense, charging the jurors 
to respect the Fugitive Slave Act and cautioning them that all “acts of Congress, placed upon 




the statute book, should command obedience.”  As to Langston’s nonviolence, the Court 
instructed the jury that the defendant’s mere presence in the crowd made him “a party to 
every act which may afterward be done by any of the others.” 
 Following those instructions, the all-white jury had little choice but to convict the 
defendant, but that turned out to be far from the last word in the case. 
 Having been found guilty, Langston was at last allowed to address the court—and the 
nation.  Judge Willson was required  by law to ask the perfunctory question—“why the 
sentence of the law should not now be pronounced upon you?”—but he could not have 
anticipated the impact of Langston’s response. 
 “I know that the courts of this country are so constituted as to oppress and outrage 
colored men,” he began.  “I cannot, then, expect, judging from the past history of the country, 
any mercy from the laws [or] from the Constitution.”  Langston described the many Kentucky 
slavehunters who had plagued Ohio, “lying hidden and skulking about, waiting for some 
opportunity to get their bloody hands on some helpless creature to drag him back—or for the 
first time—into helpless and life-long bondage.”  Langston made no apology for his part in the 
rescue, and he made it clear that he intended to continue to rescue fugitives, including those 
who were lawfully slaves: 
And there were others who had become free—to their everlasting honor I say it—by the 
exercise of their own God-given powers—by escaping from the plantations of their 
masters, eluding the blood-thirsty patrols and sentinels so thickly scattered all along 
their path, outrunning bloodhounds and horses, swimming rivers and fording swamps, 
and reaching at last, through incredible difficulties, what they, in their delusion, 
supposed to be free soil. 
 Every person, said Langston, “had a right to his liberty under the laws of God,” no 
matter what was required to secure his freedom.  And that included violent resistance.  “If ever 
a man is seized near me, and is about to be carried Southward as a slave,” Langston declared, 
then we are thrown back upon those last defences of our rights, which cannot be taken from 
us, and which God gave us that we need not be slaves.”  And still more, he announced, 
I must take upon myself the responsibility of self-protection; and when I come to be 
claimed by some perjured wretch as his slave, I shall never be taken into slavery . . . . I 
stand here to say that I will do all I can, for any man thus seized and held. 
 Never before had a black man so thoroughly defied a prosecutor, rebuked a judge, 
challenged a criminal statute, and declared his intention to continue violating the law in the 
future.  With good cause, the spectators in the courtroom broke into “great and prolonged 




applause” at Langston’s affirmation of resistance.  Newspaper reports wired the astonishing 
story across the country.  Charles Langston had become an abolitionist hero, but at what cost 
would it come when Judge Willson pronounced sentence? 
 Once again the courtroom was hushed, and this time the surprising words came from 
the bench.  Earlier that day Willson had harshly sentenced Simeon Bushnell, castigating the 
clerk’s devotion to higher law as “criminal” and “dangerous.”  But now the judge was obviously 
moved – indeed, visibly shaken – by Langston’s forceful humanity.  Willson appeared to put 
aside a sheaf of prepared remarks, and instead spoke extemporaneously and sympathetically.  
“You have done injustice to the Court,” said Judge Willson, “in thinking that nothing you might 
say could effect a mitigation of your sentence.” 
I see mitigating circumstances in the transaction which should not require, in my 
opinion, the extreme penalty of the law.  This court does not make laws . . . . We sit here 
under the obligations of an oath to execute them, and whether they be bad or whether 
they be good, it is not for us to say.  We appreciate fully your condition, and while it 
excites the cordial sympathies of our better natures, still the law must be vindicated.  On 
reflection, I am constrained to say that the penalty in your case should be comparatively 
light.  
 Willson then sentenced Charles Langston to twenty days in prison and a fine of $100.  
That was virtually the minimum possible sentence, and it came as a deep disappointment to the 
prosecution and the Buchanan administration.  It was the first time that a United States court 
had even partially recognized the legitimacy of civil disobedience in resistance to the Fugitive 
Slave Act, and it was certainly the first time that a black man’s act of defiance was considered a 
“mitigating circumstance” by a pro-slavery judge.  One small victory for the higher law. 
 Important as they were in the spring of 1859, the trials of the Oberlin rescuers were 
soon overshadowed by even more dramatic events.  John Brown led his raid on Harper’s Ferry 
the following October – with two black Oberliners at his side – and the nation’s attention 
inexorably shifted from the fate of runaways to the future of slavery itself.  There would be only 
a few more trials under the Fugitive Slave Act, and none that were as widely followed as the 
Oberlin case.  The struggle over enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act had played a significant 
role in heightening sectional animosity, but the conflict had now become irrepressible and legal 
battles would soon give way to real ones. 
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